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I. Introduction
Ever since the "minjmum contacts" analysis of International
Shoe Co. v. Washington! supplanted the pure territorial theory of
personal jurisdiction embodied in Pennoyer v. Neff, 2 the Supreme
Court's jurisdictional decisions have been marked by inconsistencies
and theoretical vagaries. For example, the Court has alternatively'
emphasized and undermined the role of state sovereignty in the due
process calculus of personal jurisdiction;3 wavered in the importance it has attached to the concept of "'purposeful availment" of the
benefits of a particular forum state's laws;4 and sought unsuccessl. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
3. Compare, e.g., World-WIde Volkswagen CoIp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980) [hereinafter World-W"ufe Volbwagen) (due process clause "acts to ensure that the
States through their COUItS do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their
stanJs as coequal sovereigns in a federal system") and Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
251 (1958) [hereinafter Hanson) (due process limitations on state court exercise of personal
jurisdiction Uare a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective
States") with Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 702 n.l0 (1982) (UIt is true that we have stated that the requirement of personal
jurisdiction. as applied to state COUItS, reflects an element of federalism and the character
of state sovereignty vis-a-vis cdler States • . . the restriction on state power descnDed in
World-W"ule Volbwagen Corp., however, must be seen ultimately as a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. ") and Phillips Petroleum
CoIp. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (due process limitations of personal jurisdiction
" 'rqnesentll a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter
of individualIiberty.' ").
For discussions of the Supreme Court's varied views on the role of state sovereignty
in personal jurisdiction doctrine,see generaJ1y Bearry v. Beech Aircraft COIp., 818 F.2d
370, 373-74 (5th Cir. 1987); R. CASAD, JL"RlSDICTlON IS ClW. Acnoss § 2.05 (1983 and
1986 Supp.); Gottlieb, In Search of the link Between ~ Process and Jurisdiction, 60
WASH. U.L.Q. 1291 (1983); Jay, "MinimJun Contacts" as a Unified Theory of Personal
Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C.L. REv. 429 (1983); Lewis, The Three Deaths of
"State Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal
Jurisdiction, 58 NOTIIE DAME L. REv. 699 (1983): Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and
pusonaJ Jurisdiaion: A 17r.wreticaI Evahuztion, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1112 (981);
SeideIson, Reazsting World-Wufe Volkswagen as a Source of Longer Jurisdictional Reach,
19 TLLSA L.J. 1 (1983); Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the I.m\' of
PusonaJ Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REv. 689 (1987); Weintraub, Due Process limitations
on the Personal JIl1isdiction of Stale Couns: Tune for Change, 63 OR. L. REv. 485
(1984); Whitten, ~ Constitutional l.irniJations on Stale Coun Jurisdiction: A HistorianInterpretive Reexamination of the Full Failh and Credit and Due Process Clauses (pan 2),
14 CREIGKION L. REv. 735, 846 (1981).
4. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) [hereinafter
Burger King) (treating purposeful avaiIment as a means to allocate the burden of persuasion
on the question of whedler a court's assertion of jurisdiction would be fair); World-Wufe
Voi.tslmgen. (treating purposeful avaiIment as a means to define "contacts" relevant to the
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fully to distinguish between the "mere" foreseeability that a person's conduct may cause injury in a particular jurisdiction (which
the Court has said is an insufficient basis for asserting personal
jurisdiction), S and the foreseeability of "being haled into court
there" (which it has said is sufficient). 6 Thus, the Court's personal
jurisdiction decisions ultimately take on a distinctive savor of ad hoc
decisionmaking and lend little principled guidance to the lower
courts.
In Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior Court, 7 the Court
recently had the opportunity to clarify some of the ambiguities surrounding personal jurisdiction doctrine. The case presented a critical issue that has divided the lower courts: whether and to what
extent a defendant whose product makes its way into a state via the
"stream of commerce" is subject to suit in the courts of that state. 8
The stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction posits that
a defendant who markets an article in such a way that it can be
expected to be carried through the stream of commerce into a
remote jurisdiction can be subjected to suit in that jurisdiction if the
product causes injury there. Unfortunately, the three opinions rendered in Asahi not only fail to resolve this question, but also renew
minimum contacts analysis); Hanson, (treating purposeful availment as dispositive factor in
determining whether state court assertion of jurisdiction exceeds territorial limitations).
For discussions of the purposeful availment requirement, see generally R. CASAD.
supra note 3, at §§ 2.02[4][e], 2.04[2][e][ii], 2.05, 2.07, 7.02[2]; Gottlieb, supra note 3,
at 1294-1303; Perschbacher, Minimum Contacts ReapplUd: Mr. Justice Brennan Has it
His Way in Burger King Corp: v. Rutize.,.,-ic;z, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 585; Stein, supra note
3, at 735-38: Note, Constitutional Limitarions on Stare Long Ann Jurisdiction, 49 l:. CHI.
L. REv. 156, 170-72 (1982).
5. World-Wide Vo/k.s'd.'CZgen, 444 U.S. at 295-96.
6. Id. at 297.
7. 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
8. See. e.g., Max Daetv.'Yler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 19851 (rejecting theory): Humble v. Toyota Motor Co., 727 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)
(rejecting theory): Noel Y. S. S. Kresge Co., 669 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1982) (accepting
theory); Wiles v. Morita Iron Works, S04 N.E.2d 942 (TIl. 1987) (accepting theory);
Charles Gendler & Co. v. Telecom Equip. Corp., 508 A.2d 1127 (N.J. 1986) (accepting
theory); Kawasaki Steel Corp. Y. Middleton, 669 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1985) (accepting
theory).
Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court [hereinafter Asalul also presented a second
troublesome question: whether an alien defendant is entitled to more, less. or the same
level of protection from state coun assertions of jurisdiction than similarly situated
domestic defendants. The Court ultimately resolved the case on grounds that implicitly
considered, but did not expressly depend. on the defendant's status as an alien (Japanese)
corporation.
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old ones about the conceptual foundations underlying the law of personal jurisdiction.
This article evaluates the stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction in light of existing precedent and the constitutional
imperative of due process. Part II briefly describes the factual
background of Asahi and the various opinions rendered in the case.
Part m outlines the development of jurisdictional doctrine since
International Shoe, emphasizing the meaning of "purposeful avail:
ment" and its fluid role in the due process equation governing state
court jurisdiction. Part IV then traces the evolution of the stream of
commerce theory since International Shoe. Part V examines and
rejects criticisms of the stream of commerce theory, and concludes
that under any reasonabre interpretation of the due process parameters on jurisdiction, the stream of commerce theory as it is .ordinarily used-as a justification for specific jurisdiction-ought to survive
constitutional scrutiny. Therefore, any defendant who knows or
should know that a product he markets will be used and may cause
injury in a foreign jurisdiction should be amenable, as a constitutional matter, to suit there in a cause of action related to the product. To the extent that the plaintiffs chosen forum is truly an
inconvenient one, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is available
to relieve the defendant of any onerous litigation burdens.
II. Uncertain Implications for the Stream of Commerce Theory
of Personal Jurisdiction
A. Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior Court

1he Asall; case arose out of a motorcycle accident involving two
California residents, one of whom was killed. The surviving accident victim brought a products liability action in a California state
court alleging that the accident was caused by defects in the motorcycle's tire, tube, or sealant. He named as defendants Sterling May
Co., the California retailer, and Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co.,
the Taiwanese manufacturer of the motorcycle tire.
Cheng Shin impleaded and sought indemnity from Asahi Metal
Industries, a major Japanese concern that had manufactured the
tube's valve assembly. 9 Eventually, the plaintiff settled his claims
9. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Coon, 39 Cal. 3d 35,41,702 P.2d 543, 544, 216
Cal. Rptr. 385, 387 (1985).
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against the original defendants. Cheng Shin's claim ag!linst Asahi
for indemnity, as well as several other indemnity claims among the
direct defendants, remained.
Asahi sought dismissal of Cheng Shin's indemnity action on the
ground that the state court lacked personal jurisdiction over it.
Asahi was a major Japanese producer and exporter of tire valve
assemblies whose product was incorporated into motorcycle tires
sold around the world. Although Asahi had never sold its valves
directly to California companies, for ten years it had regularly sold
valves to Cheng Shin for incorporation into the latter's motorcycle
tires, and some of these tires were in turn regularly sold to the California manufacturer of the motorcycle involved in the accident. 10
The California Court of Appeals held that assertion of jurisdiction
under the California long arm statute would be unconstitutional,11
but the California Supreme Court reversed. 12
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. Justice O'Connor cast the issue in the case as whether
the mere awareness on the part of a foreign defendant that the
components it manufactured, sold, and delivered outside the
United States would reach the forum state in the stream of commerce constitutes "minimum contacts" ... such that the exercise of jurisdiction "does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.' "13

But the issue was not whether "mere awareness" constitutes "minimum contacts." Asahi's. relevant contacts with California were that
its products were sold and allegedly caused injury there. The issue
was whether specific jurisdiction might properly be based on contacts of this nature. 14
10. [d. at 41, 7m P.2d at 545,216 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
11. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Coun, 147 Cal. App. 3d 30, 194 Cal. Rptr. 741
(1983) (granting petition for writ of mandamus qnashing service of process), rev'd, 39 Cal.
3d 35, 702 P.2d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1985).
12. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Coun, 39 Cal. 3d 35, 7m P.2d 543,216 Cal. Rptr.
385 (1985), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
13. Asaro, 107 S. Ct. 1026. 1029 (citations omitted).
14. [d. at 1033. "Specific" personal jurisdiction exists when a defendant's contacts
with the forum state arise out of or are related to the cause of action. "General" persooal
jurisdiction exists when the defendant's contacts with the forum state do not arise out of or
are unrelated to the cause of action. Generally speaking, coons demand a higher quality
and quantity of contacts to suppon an assertion of general jurisdiction than of specific
jurisdiction. See generally Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
414-16 & nn.8-9 (l984) [hereinafter Helicopreros]: Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State Courts
(ft'er Non-residents in Our Federal System, 43 COR.'"ELL L.Q. 196 (1957) (introducing concept of general and isolated contact jurisdiction); yon Mehren & Traunnan, Jurisdiction 10
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The opinions in the case create new uncertainties in the law of
personal jurisdiction. Although all nine justices concurred in the
judgment of reversal, the three separate opinions filed in the case
reveal a deep schism in the Court concerning the meaning and role
of purposeful availment, particularly in the stream of commerce
context.
Justice O'Connor's opinion can effectively be viewed as two
separate opinions-Part IT.A., which addresses the stream of com:'
merce/purposeful availment issue, and in which only three other
justices joined, and Part IT.B., which deals with the international
aspects of the case, and in which all members of the Court except
Iustice Scalia joined. This article is concerned principally with the
potential impact of Part"IT.A. In Part IT.A., four members of the
Court in effect concluded that the stream of commerce theory of
personal jurisdiction could not survive constitutional scrutiny. Specifically, the O'Connor plurality took the position that a defendant
who knows that its product will make its way into a jurisdiction via
the stream of commerce has nevertheless not purposefully directed
its activities toward that jurisdiction. Under the O'Connor plurality's view, some level of purposeful activity is a prerequisite to
amenability to suit, and Asahi' s contacts with California were not in
fact purposeful. Thus, these four justices strongly suggest that the
stream of commerce theory is fundamentally flawed, and that assertions of jurisdiction based on that theory are unconstitutional. IS
In an opinion by Justice Brennan, four justices indicated their
support of the stream of commerce theory: "The stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the
regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale. "16 In Iustice Brennan's view, a defendant
who has engaged in a marketing scheme that makes use of these
"eddies and streams," knowing that his product is being sold in a
remote jurisdiction, has notice of the possibility of suit there. A
defendant's act of placing his product in the stream of commerce
satisfies any threshold requirement of purposeful conduct. At fust
blush, the Brennan plurality opinion, in which Justices White, MarAdjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 liAR\". L. 1tE\.. 1121. 1136-63 11966,. The e:'(tent
may be "related to" a cause of action even though they do not ··arise
out of" it and whether this is a distinction without a difference. are unclear. See
Helicopreros. 466 U.S. at 415 n.10; id. at 426-27 (Brennan. 1.. dissenting).
15. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033.
16. 107 S. Ct. at 1035 (Brennan. 1.. concurring in pan and in judgment/.

to which contacts
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shall, and Blackmun joined, appears to ensure that at least four
members of the Court would uphold the theory. But Justices White
and Blackmun also joined in Justice Stevens' somewhat confusing
opinion; consequently, these two justices' views on the issue are not
completely clear.
Justice Stevens suggests, first, that the Court should not have
addressed the purposeful availment question at all, and second, that
the Validity of the stream of commerce theory in a particular case
depends on several quantitative factors that were probably, though
not definitely, present in Asahi. 17 As noted, it is difficult to know
the extent to which other members of the Court share Justice
Stevens' views, because Justices White and Blackmun, who purported to join Justice Brennan's opinion, also concurred in this
opinion.

B. Fallout from Asahi
The lower courts have variously interpreted the fragmented
Asahi decision as it relates to the stream of commerce question.
Some courts appear to view the case as sounding the death knell for
the stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction. In Sollinger v. Nasca International, Inc., 18 a copyright infringement case,
the Vermont district court implied that Asahi would preclude basing
jurisdiction on the defendant's act of placing its infringing products
into the stream of comnierce, but upheld the assertion of personal
jurisdiction on other grounds. Similarly, in Witbeck v. Bill Cody's
Ranch Inn,19 the Supreme Court of Michigan viewed Asahi as consistent with that court's own prior decisions rejecting the stream of
commerce theory as a basis for asserting jurisdiction.
Conversely, the Texas Supreme Court in Keen v. Ashot Ashkelon, Ltd. ,20 simply ignored Asahi's pronouncements on this subject, relying on earlier decisions of the Court that can be read to
endorse the stream of commerce theory as a legitimate basis for
upholding an assertion of jurisdiction.
Some courts have sought to avoid the potential implications of
Asahi by limiting the decision to the facts of that particular case.
17.
18.
19.
10.

ld. at 1038. (Stevens. 1.• concurring in part and in judgment).
655 F. supp. 1385. 1388-89 ro. Vt. 1987).
428 Mich. 659. 411 ~.W.2d 439 (1987).
748 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. 1988),
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Thus, in Dittman v. Code-a-Phone Corp., 21 an Indiana district court
asserted that "a major distinction" can be drawn between a manufacturer of component parts whose product is incorporated into
another's and sold in remote jurisdictions, as in Asahi, and a manufacturer who sells finished products to an intermediate distributor
who, in tum, markets those products abroad. 22 And in McBead
Drilling Co. v. Kremco, Ltd., 23 the Louisiana Supreme Court did
not view Asahi as dispositive of the stream of commerce theory
because the case involved an alien defendant seeking indemnity
from another alien defendant in a domestic forum. In Asahi, the
Louisiana court reasoned, there was "clearly an insufficient relationship among the California forum, the Japanese corporate defendant, and the litigation of the indemnity issue. "24
Finally, many courts have simply acknowledged Asahi~s ambiguity concerning the Validity of the stream of commerce theory. 25
They cite the decision's lack of a majority opinion on the subject, as
well as its potential inconsistency with some of the Court's prior
decisions, as a basis for concluding, as did one Michigan district
court, that Asahi "reflects the debate, both among the Justices and
the circuits, over what exactly constitutes minimum contacts via the
stream of commerce. "26
As these cases demonstrate, Asahi leaves a major gap in the law
of personal jurisdiction. The only certainty is that the present Court
is deeply divided over the scope and Validity of the stream of commerce theory. This division appears to stem from more fundamental disputes concerning the meaning of "purposeful availment," its
role in detennining the appropriateness of jurisdiction, and whether
federalism concerns ought to continue to influence jurisdictional
doctrine. The three Asahi opinions will undoubtedly continue to be
the basis of much judicial speculation as to the Court's future treatment of stream of commerce cases. The remainder of this article
will trace the development of the purposeful availment requirement,
21. 666 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
22. See also Hall v. Zambelli, 669 F. Supp. 753. 757 (S.D. W. Va. 1987) (Asahi
involved manufacturer of component part rather than manufacturer of finished product
distributed throughout United States through domestic distnOutor).
23. 509 So. 2d 429 (La. 1987).
24. [d. at 433 n.7.
15. E.g.• Hall v. Zambelli, 669 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. W. Va. 1987): Ag-Chem Equip.
Co. v. Avec Corp.. 666 F. Supp. 1010 (W.D. Mich. 1987 ): Poole and Kent Co. \'.
Equilease Assoc .. 71 Md. App. 9. 523 A.2d 1018 (987).
26. Ag-Chem Equip. Co. v. Avco Corp., 666 F. Supp. at 1014.
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outline the history of the stream of commerce theory. and evaluate
the various views represented in Asahi in light of the Coun's
previously articulated jurisdictional doctrine.

m.

The Concept of "Purposeful Availment"

A. Minimum Contacts Theory and the Origins of the Purposeful
Availment Requirement
Before 1945, in deference to due process, the U.S. Supreme
Conn had consistently held that a conn could not assert nonCODsensual27 personal jurisdiction over a person or thing that was not
physically present within its jurisdiction. This territorial theory of
jurisdiction treated each state as an independent sovereign whose
authority to legislate and adjudicate did not extend beyond its borders. 28 As American society became more complex and mobile, the
27. Even under the territorial model of personal jurisdiction of Penrwyer l·. Neff
[hereinafter Pennoyer), a defendant cooId consent to a state COIll1's assertion of jurisdiction. See generally J. FRlEDE>1HAL, M. KA...."E, A.'1> A. Mn.t.et, CI\-1L PRocEnt.1tE § 3.5
(1985). State coons and legislatures in the post·Pennoyer, pre-Imemational Shoe era used
the consent theory as a means of circumventing the limitations of the territorial approach
related to physical presence. St.atDtes requiring corporations to consent to senice of process within the fmum state as a condition of doing business became rommonplace. as did
nonresident mororist Sfittlltes that implied consent to suit by anyooe driving a motor vehicle
within the state. A coosent theory is difficult to justify, of course, if personal jurisdiction
rules exist to proteet state sovereignty; a priVaIe litigant should not be able unilaterally to
waive one state's objection to another state's judicial overreaching. Despite this fundamental defect in the ron.sent theory, the Supreme Coon routinely upheld state coon assertions
of personal jurisdiction that coIild be characterized as coo.sensual under express or implied
ron.sent statutes. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (upholding nonresident
motorist statute creating implied consent to be sued); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 G.S. 350
(1882) (upholding state statute requiring corporation's consent to service of process as a
rondition of doing business \\ithin the state).
For oWer criticisms of the consent theory. see Stein, supra DOte 3, at 696: Kurland.
The 5JqJreme Court, the Due Process Cltmse and the In Personam JUrisdictiOfl of Slate
Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569. 575-82 (1958).
28. The territorial theory of jurisdiction arose from POl1wyer, 95 U.S. 714, 722
(1877), and was purponedly based on "well establi.sbed principles of [international] law:'
Id. at 722. Justice Field relied on a Jeading nineteenth cennuy treatise on internationa.l
law, J. STORY, CoMME.'>'TARIESOSlHECOSFUCTOFUWS. FOREJGSA.'1)~ (1834 ed. and
photo reprint 1972) [hereinafter CoMME.'>'TAIUES]. The principles from which Justice Field
seems to derive an absolute prescription against extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction are
two of the three maxims set forth in Story's great treatise. But Story's third maxim pro\-ided that the laws of one coonny may have an effect in another through the express or
tacit consent of the other coont:ry. Story realized that an effective inIematiooal system
requires sovereign states to recognize the laws of odler governments if the interests of that
state are not thereby prejudiced:
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limitations of the strict territorial theory became increasingly apparent. Courts and legislatures developed elaborate fictions to bring
intuitively reasonable assertions of in personam jurisdiction within
its parameters. 29
In the 1945 case International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the
Supreme Court partially· abandoned the pretenses of the territorial
theory in favor of a "flexible" approach intended to ensure fairness
to defendants called to court. The Court said there that "due proc':
ess requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment
in personam ... he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.' "30 Among the relevant considerations as to whether this· constitutional standard was met were the
extent of the inconvenience of defending in a remote forum, .whether
the defendant's "contacts" with the forum were continuous and sysThe true foundation, on which the administration of international law must rest,
is, that the rules, which are to govern, are those, which arise from mutual interest and utility, from a sense of the inconveniences, which would result from
a contrary doctrine, and from a sort of moral necessity to do justice, in order
that justice may be done to us in return.
CoMMENTARIES, at 34 (emphasiS added).
Story's view of the role of comity between sovereigns was thus pragmatic. Although
international law certainly did not compel a country to recognize the laws of a foreign
state, Story did not believe that it prohibited a country from doing so. COMMa"TAPJES, at
24. Moreover, Story expressly acknowledged that the principle of comity was also broad
enough to encompass the recognition of foreign judgments. Id. at 452. Field's basic
premise in Pennoyer was thus arguably erroneous. Moreover, as Professor Kurland has
observed, Story dealt with conflicts of law at the international level; "[t]hese doctrines
were borrowed from laws relating to wholly independent sovereignties which were not
relevant to jurisdictions joined in a federation." Kurland, supra note 27, at 585.
29. The fictions associated with the consent theory of personal jurisdiction are one
example of how states attempted to circumvent Penn oyer's limiting principles. See supra
note 27. Courts dealt with the special problem of corporations in yet another way: by
reasoning that a corporation was "present," and therefore was subject to suit, wherever it
was "doing business." This "doing business" inquiry "soon substituted that shibboleth
for any theory. Without looking back of the words, the courts held that jurisdiction existed
if the corporate defendant was 'doing business' within the jurisdiction but no jurisdiction
existed if it were not 'doing business.'" Kurland, supra note 27, at 585. Although International Shoe bad generally been perceived as replacing the "doing business" test for personal jurisdiction with minimum contacts analysis, the Court recently appeared to revive
the doctrine in Helicopteros when it relied heavily on an ancient "doing business" case,
Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.s. 516 (1923), as justification for
denying the Texas courts power to exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign defendant
having limited contacts with Texas. See R. CASAD, supra note 3, at § 2.04[2][e][viii]
(Supp. 1986). Subpart II.A. of Justice O'Connor's AsaJ-J opinion, as well as Justice
Stevens' opinion, contains language reminiscent of the "doing business" line of cases.
30. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940».
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tematic (as opposed to isolated or sporadic), whether the plaintiffs
cause of action was related to the defendant's contacts with the
forum, and whether the defendant had received the benefits and protection of the laws of the state. 31
International Shoe represented a major departure from pure territorial jurisdictional analysis in favor of one based primarily on
"fairness" or "reasonableness." The Court made no effort to
defme the concept of "contacts." Presumably, any nexus between
the defendant's activities and the forum state constituted a "contact" for purposes of minimum contacts analysis. 32
The Court's next jurisdictional decision, McGee v. International
life Insurance Co., 33 resolved a question that had divided the lower
courts: whether a single contact was sufficient to support jurisdiction. 34 McGee was significant largely because it made clear that
specific jurisdiction could be based on an isolated contact. 3S It left
intact the jurisdictional analysis set out in International Shoe.
31. ld. at 317-19.
32. In the years following International Shoe, courts developed classes of cases in
which jurisdiction was almost automatically treated as "fair" or "unfair." Where a
defendant's contacts were "continuous and systematic" and the plaintiff's cause of action
was related to them, the exercise of jurisdiction was considered consistent with the due
process clause. Where the contacts were more isolated and the cause of action unrelated,
jurisdiction was generally deemed inappropriate. See generally Donahue v. Far Eastern
Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1981), and cases cited therein. For
discussions of the early post-International Shoe cases, see generally Kurland, supra note
27, at 593-611; Note, The Growth oime International Shoe Doctrine, 16 U. CHI. L. REv.
523 (1949).
33. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
34. See Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 573, 80 A.2d 664, 666
(1951) (citation omitted):
We are of the opinion that the United States Supreme Court has left undecided
whether isolated tortious activity could result in a proper subjection of a foreign
corporation to suit in the forum when the cause of action arose out of that activity; no generally applicable standards can be ascertained from the decisions
beyond the International Shoe case • • • The American Law Instinue indi<:ates
that the issue is open as of 1948.
Sm)1h upheld single act, specific jurisdiction. Id. at 575-77, 80 A.2d at 669. BU1 see
Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502,505 (4th Cir. 1956); Note,
supra note 32, at 530-31 (suggesting that courts generally are reluctant to assert jurisdiction
based on continuous and substantial operations if the cause of action is not related to the
operations).
35. "[Al fair interpretation of McGee is that jurisdiction over a nonresident is permissible whenever he voluntarily performs a single act within the forum, provided, of
course, that the asserted cause of action is related to the single act upon which jurisdiction
is predicated." Note, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in Product Liability Actions, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 1028, 1030 (1965).
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The basic formula for testing state court in personam jurisdiction thus remained unchanged until the Court's 1958 decision in
Hanson v. Denckla. 36 In Hanson, the Court refined the meaning of
"minimum contacts," holding that only those contacts resulting
from the defendant's ""purposeful availment" of the forum state's
legal and procedural benefits were relevant to minimum contacts
analysis.37 This definition significantly altered International Shoe's
approach, which viewed whether or not the defendant had benefitted
from the forum state's laws as but one relevant factor.
The case involved a Delaware bank acting as trustee for a settlor who had moved from Pennsylvania to Florida. The settlor continued her communications with the bank from Florida until her
death. The final administration of the trust led to two lawsuits
involving the bank, the first in Florida and the second in Delaware. The bank failed to appear in the Florida suit and the Florida
court entered judgment against it. The Delaware court, however,
entered a judgment inconsistent with the Florida court's judgment,
accepting the argument that the Florida court had lacked jurisdiction
over the bank in the prior proceedings. On appeal, the plaintiffs
from the Florida lawsuit demanded that the Florida judgment be
reinstated. 38
Applying its refined minimum contacts test, the Court found
that the requisite purposeful availment of Florida's laws was lacking
because the bank's contacts with Florida had resulted exclusively
from the settlor's unilateral act of moving to Florida and directing
the bank, from Florida, to take certain actions concerning the trust.
Accordingly, it held that the Florida judgment was invalid. 39
Hanson's treatment of the purposeful availment question has
proven problematic because the Court did not clearly articulate what
it meant by purposeful availment. The Court insisted that the minimum contacts test was grounded in ""territorial limitations on the
power of the respective States,"4{) suggesttng implicitly that the
requirement of purposeful availment ensured iliat a state would not
exceed the scope of its sovereign authority . Yet it did not really
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

357 U.S. 235 (1958).
Ill. at 253.
Ill. at 242.
Ill. at 252.
Ill. at 251.
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explain how purposeful availment is related to sovereignty, and it is
difficult to see the purported link between these two concepts. 41
Whatever the explanation for this linkage, Hanson made clear
that International Shoe should not be construed as a complete repudiation of the sovereignty-based, territorial theory of jurisdiction.
This insistence that the due process limitations on personal jurisdiction embody sovereignty concerns is the primary source of the
theoretical inconsistencies in the Court's more recent personal jurisdiction decisions. Indeed, it appears to be at the heart of the
justices' dispute in Asahi over the Validity of the stream of commerce theory. The remainder of this part discusses what in a sense
is the key to resolving the question of the validity of the stream of
commerce theory: the meaning and role of purposeful availment.

B. The Meaning of Purposeful Availment
For nearly two decades after Hanson, the Court paid scant
attention to how the jurisdictional principles developed in International Shoe, McGee, and Hanson, were playing out in state and
lower federal courts. 42 Over the past eleven years, however, the
Court has exhibited a renewed interest in personal jurisdiction doctrine. Several cases decided during this period involved claims that
specific conduct did not amount to purposeful avai1ment within the
meaning of Hanson.
The first case after Hanson to present the purposeful availment
issue was Shaffer v. Heitner, decided in 1977. 43 In Shaffer, a shareholder derivative suit· brought in Delaware against officers and
directors of a Delaware corporation, the Supreme Court rejected a
simplistic territorial approach to quasi in rem jurisdiction, holding
that all assertions of personal jurisdiction, whether in personam, in
41. One explanation is that the purposeful availment creates a reciprocity between the
state and the defendant that justifies the state court's assertion of jurisdiction over the
defendant. That is, a defendant who has deliberately taken advantage of some aspects of
a state's sovereign powers, as by engaging in business activities within the state that are
expressly regnIated and protected by the statutes of the state, should not complain when
anodler of those powers (i.e. the power to adjudicate) is exerted against it.
42. HIn the d~ following [ITl1emationaI Shoe, McGee, and Hanson] the Supreme
Coon routinely denied petitions for certiorari in jurisdictional cases, leaving the states free
to experiment with long-arm legislation." Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United
Stales and in the European Communities: If ComparisOn, 82 MIcH. L. lID'. 1195, 1199
(1984).

43. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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rem, or quasi in rem, are subject to minimum contacts analysis.
The Court then went on to consider whether the defendants' contacts
with the forum state were constitutionally sufficient to support jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, the Court's consideration of the purposeful
availment issue was cursory, offering virtually no guidance as to the
meaning of the concept. The plaintiff contended that because Delaware law provided substantial benefits to the defendants, it waS
"only fair and just" that they be amenable to suit there. The Court
found this unpersuasive, on the ground that the defendants had "had
nothing to do with the State of Delaware" and "had no reason to
expect to be haled before a Delaware court. "44
This reasoning is implausible. Each of the defendants had purchased shares of stock in the corporation, the situs of which was
Delaware under Delaware law. This is "having something to do
with Delaware"-that is, contact with the state-if only in a metaphysical sense. Moreover, one wonders where corporate fiduciaries
of a Delaware corporation would expect to be sued for breach of
duty in a derivative suit if not in Delaware. 4S Shaffer obviously did
little to clarify what sort of conduct would meet the threshold
requirement of purposeful contacts with a state.
Kulko v. Superior Court,46 decided the following year, similarly
failed to articulate a clear definition of purposeful availment. In
Kulko. a California resident sought modification in a California state
court of the child custody and child support provisions of a Haitian
divorce decree. The defendant's only "contact" with the state was
that he allowed his daughter to live there with her mother despite the
terms of the divorce decree giving him custody during the school
year.
The Supreme Court agreed that California could not constitutionally assert jurisdiction against the father based on his "acquiesence" to his daughter's desire to live in California. "A father
who agrees, in the interests of family harmony and his children's
preferences, to allow them to spend more time in California than
was required under a separation agreement can hardly be said to
44. [d. at 216.
45. Compare Weintraub, supra note 3, at 493 (footnote omitted) ("It is fair to compel
directors to respond to a stockholders' derivative suit in the state of incorporation ... they
could 'reasonably anticipate being haled into court there' to account for their actions. ").
46. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
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have 'purposefully availed himself of the 'benefits and protections'
of California's laws. "47 The Court emphasized that the defendant
had not obtained any benefits from California. The Court attributed
any fmancial "benefits" to the father resulting from his daughter's
decision to live in California to her absence from New York, where
the father lived, and to the mother's failure to initiate a support
modification proceeding in New York.
Although the result in Kulko seems intuitively correct, it is difficult to articulate why the father's contacts with California did not
result from purposeful conduct on his part. Unlike the bank in Hanson, which had played no part in the settlor's decision to move to
Florida and could not have prevented the move, the father in Xulleo
did have the ability to prevent his child from moving to California.
He had chosen not to do so in the interest of family harmony. In
this sense, at least, his contacts with California can be viewed as
resulting from his own purposeful acts.
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood5on,48 a 1980 five-tofour decision, the Court held that the defendant, an automobile
retailer in New York, had not purposefully availed itself of the
benefits of Oklahoma law by selling a vehicle to persons who later
travelled through that state. The majority likened the consumer's
"unilateral" act of driving an automobile through a remote jurisdiction to the "unilateral" activity involved in Hanson.
The Court illustrated its conception of the meaning of purposeful contacts by contrasting the •'isolated occurrence" involved in the
case with one in which a defendant has "delivered its products into
the stream of commerce with the expectation that they "Kill be purchased by consumers in the forum state. "49 The point seemed to be
that when a defendant's activities make contacts with a particular
jurisdiction very likely, contacts that arise may be considered purposeful within the meaning of Hanson. World-Wide Volkswagen
thus appeared to resolve the question of purposefulness in terms of
a defendant's reasonable expectations.
In Calder v. Jones,so a case with facts analogous in some ways
to Asahi's, the Court considered whether jurisdiction could be based
on contacts created by distribution decisions of a third party. The
47. Id. at 94.
48. World-Wule Volkswagen. 444 C.S. 286 (1980).
49. Id. at 298 (emphasis added).
SO. 465 C.S. 783 (984).
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defendants were the author and the editor of an allegedly libelous
story published in the National Enquirer. The alleged defamatory
statements concerned a California resident. The defendants argued
that because they had no control over where the magazine was distributed-that decision was made by the publishers-it was unfair to
hold them accountable in California based on the fact that the
Enquirer was widely circulated there.
The Court summarily rejected this argument, observing that the
defendants clearly knew their out-of-state actions would have a "p0tentially devastating" effect in California. Although the Court
never expressly discussed the concept of "purposeful availment" in
Calder, the appellant briefed the issue,51 and the case must logically
be viewed as being partially concerned with the meaning of that
phrase.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,52 decided in 1985, was the
Supreme Court's last major jurisdictional decision before Asahi.
The case dealt with the issue of purposeful availment in the context
of a contractual dispute. The defendant Rudzewicz was part-owner
of a Burger King franchise in Michigan. The Florida-based Burger
King Corporation sued Rudzewicz and his partner in Florida for
breach of contract and trademark infringement. The defendants had
allegedly fallen behind in their monthly contract payments and had
continued to use Burger King trademarks and trade secrets after
being forbidden to do so by the company. The franchise agreement
had been negotiated in Michigan through Burger King's regional
office, which in tum had cleared the terms of the ultimate agreement
with the Florida headquarters. The contract obligated Rudzewicz to
make payments to the company in Florida and provided that disputes
would be governed by Florida law. Rudzewicz contended that Florida could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over him due to
his lack of substantial purposeful contacts with the state. The
Eleventh Circuit accepted this argument, but the Supreme Court
reversed in a 6-2 decision. 53
In Burger King, the Court again viewed purposeful availment as
a means for distinguishing between fortuitous and anticipated relationships with a particular state. Although Rudzewicz had no physical contacts with Florida and had established his relationship with
51. Brieffor Appellant at 18-20, Calder ". Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (No. 82-1401) (1984).
52. 471 U.S. 462 (198S).
53. Justice Powell did not participate in the case. Id. at 487.
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Burger King only through his dealings with the Michigan office,
"he most certainly knew that he was affiliating himself with an
enterprise based primarily in Florida." 54 The Court stated that the
obvious level of control that Burger King had exercised over the
contract negotiations, the nature of Rudzewicz's contractual relationship with the company, and the choice of law provision contained in the contract, all should have alerted him that he was
entering into a relationship with a Florida resident, not a Michigan
resident. Although his contacts with a Florida resident might
arguably be viewed as indirect contacts with Florida, ss the Court
said that these contacts plainly did not result from a mere accident
of fate, as had the retailer defendant's contacts with Oklahoma in
World-Wide Volkswagen. Rudzewicz had every reason to expect
that his contractual dealings with Burger King, though they originated in Michigan, would have an impact in Florida and could give
rise to litigation there. In the majority's view, this was adequate to
satisfy the purposeful availment criterion, which in turn justified a
Florida court's assertion of jurisdiction over him.
The Shaffer to Burger King line of cases illustrates that, although the Supreme Court has never expressly defined purposeful
availment, in recent years it has typically used that term to describe
a pattern of behavior by a defendant that can objectively be expected
to result in contacts between the defendant and the state in question.
The Court's decisions indicate that the defendant must undertake
affirmative acts that ultirilately bring him in contact with the state,
but they also make clear that "purpose" does not equal "subjective
intent," that "purpose;' has very little to do with "control," and
that ' 'purposeful" contacts need not be direct ones. Thus, the
Court's inability to reach a consensus about whether Asahi's acts
amounted to conduct "purposefully directed" toward California is
difficult to comprehend.
54. Id. at 480.
55. On one hand. it seems somewhat disingenuous to characterize Rudzev.icz·s c0ntacts as . ·indirect." inasmuch liS be e\idently made payments directly to Burger King at its
Miami beadquaners. But as both the Ele\'emh Circuit and Justice Ste'iens in his dissenting
opinion observed. all negotiations leading to consummation of the contractual agreemem
took place in !-fichigan between Rudzev.icz. his partner. and Burger King's Michigan
office. The Michigan office furnished all services to which Rudzev.icz was entitled and
supervision to which be had agreed under the contract. In this sense. Burger King had
"insulated itself from direct dealings v.ith .. Rudzev.icz. id. at 489 (quoting Burger King \'.
MacShara. 724 F.2d 1505. 1512 (lIth Cir. 1984}), and so the defendant's principal c0ntacts with Florida were only indirect.
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C. The Role of Purposeful Avai1ment
In the same cases in which it was fleshing out the meaning of
Hanson's purposeful availment requirement, the Court was trying to
explain why the concept was integral to jurisdictional due process.
The Hanson Court's statement that a defendant's purposeful availment of the benefits of a particular forum's laws was relevant to
personal jurisdiction, added an important gloss to the fairnessoriented minimum contacts analysis. The Court justified this gloss
by stating that personal jurisdiction doctrine purports to protect state
sovereignty, and that requiring purposeful availment ensures that a
state does not improperly transgress its territorial bounds in exercising its adjudicatory powers. 56 The subsequent purposeful availment
decisions, however. reflect considerable discomfort with both of
these assertions. Not surprisingly, the vacillations in these later
decisions have coincided with the Court's everchanging views
regarding the emphasis that personal jurisdiction doctrine should accord to state sovereignty considerations.
In Shaffer, for example, the Court was anxious to repudiate the
idea that territorial concerns oUght to playa significant role in determining the limits of state court jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. 57 Otherwise, it would be difficult to justify abolishing pure
in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, which had been permissible
bases for jurisdiction under the territorial model.
Likewise, in Kulko, the Court's overarching concern was with
fairness, not sovereignty. Significantly, the Court's conclusion that
the father had not purposefully availed himself of the benefits of
California law did not end the matter, though under the Hanson formulation of the minimum contacts test it would have. Other factors,
such as the potential adverse impact on California's exercise of
jurisdiction on substantive social policies, were equally relevant and
ultimately determinative. 58
Three years later. however, World-Wide Volksv.:agen vivified
both the underlying premise of Hanson-that personal jurisdiction
doctrine protects state sovereignty-and the correlative notion that
jurisdiction is improper in the absence of purposeful availment. The
Court insisted that the minimum contacts test:
56. Hanson. 357 t.:.S. at 251.
5;. Shaffer. 433 C.S. at 213-14.
58. KJdko, 436 {i.S. at 96-101.
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perform[s] two related, but distinguishable functions. It protects
the defendant against the burden of litigating in a distant or
inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States,
through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed
on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal
system. S9

The Court thus implied that the purposeful availment requirement
fosters the federalism aspect of minimum contacts analysis. 60
Unfortunately, the Court's reasoning on this subject is SOI1lewhat confusing. According to the majority, a defendant that has
purposefully availed itself of the benefits of a particular state "has
clear notice that it is subject to suit there. "61 Vlhat notice to the
defendant has to do with protecting federalism, however, is not
clearly explained. The Court's reminder that a defendant on notice
that he may be sued in a particular state "can act to alleviate the risk
of burdensome litigation by . . . severing its connection with the
State"62 suggests that reciprocity of benefits and burdens is important. Notwithstanding the confusion, World-Wide Volkswagen
plainly stood for the proposition that in the absence of purposeful
availment, there was no assurance that the exercise of jurisdiction
did not encroach on another state's sovereignty.
In Burger King, the Court again retreated63 from its assertions
that due process limitations on jurisdiction exist to protect state
sovereignty. ~ The case arguably represents a return to International Shoe's basic "minimum contacts" framework. The opinion
does not expressly refer to any state sovereignty component of due
process; as in Shaffer, the Court's primary concern in the case was
with whether the assertion of jurisdiction was Hfair. ,59. World-Wuie Jolkswagen. ~ C.S. at 291-92.
60. Id. at 294.
61. [d. at 297.
62. /d.
63. The Coon began its retreat in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee. 456 l:.S. 694 (1982). While the Coon ackoou'ledged the sovereignty
rationale for due process limitations on jurisdiction. it stated that "[t]he personal jurisdiction req'Jirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a
restriction on judicial po.....er DOt as a matter of sovereignty. but as a matter of individual
liberty:' [d. at 702 (f()(){I)()(e omitted).
64. Of course. the very requirement that a defendant must ha\'e minimum contacts \\ith
the forum state contains an element of federalism. Moreo\·er. the Court also noted the
relevance of factors such as the forum state's interest in the litigation and the interests of
the interstate judicial system. factors that implicitly take so\'ereignty concerns into
account. Burger King. 105 S. Ct. at 2184.
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Burger King seems to establish the proposition that if a defendant's contacts with the forum state result from purposeful availmem, jurisdiction is presumptively "fair." If they do not, the
plaintiff appears to have the burden of showing that other factors
weigh in favor of jurisdiction. 65 Burger King thus casts the purposeful avaiIment requirement in a new role: a threshold indicator
of fairness that can conveniently allocate the burden of persuasion
on the question of the appropriateness of jurisdiction. The case alsO
suggests, however, that in some circumstances a state court could
fairly assert personal jurisdiction even if the defendant had no purposeful contacts with the forum state.
The Court's jurisdictional decisions antedating Asahi display
erratic swings between a conviction that personal jurisdiction doctrine must protect federalism and the abandonment of that premise.
With Burger ,King, purposeful availment inquiry apparently had
evolved from a device to ensure that states did not overstep their territorial bounds to one that allocated the burden of persuasion on the
question of fairness. Thus, although the concept of "purposeful
availment" retains a special significance, Burger King left open the
possibility that a defendant's "nonpurposeful" contacts with a state
will be constitutionally sufficient to support jurisdiction.
IV. The Stream of Commerce Theory of Personal Jurisdiction
The foregoing discussion has illustrated that the notion of purposeful availment has played a central role in the Court's personal
65. The critical language in Burger King is as follows:
Once it has been decided that a defendant pmposefully established minimum
cootacts within the forum &ate, these contacts may be considered in light of
other factors to determine wbedler the assertion of personal jurisdiction would
compon with ufuir play and substantial justice." Thus coons in "appropriate
case[sr' may evaluate "the burden on the defendant," "the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute," uthe plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief," "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining
the most efficiem resolution of controversies," and the ushared interest of the
several States in fuItbering fundamental substantive social policies." These
considerations sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction
upon a lesser ~ing of minimum contacts than would otberv.ise be required.
On the other hand, where a defendant who bas purposefully directed his activities toWard forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, be must present a
compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render
jurisdiction unreasonable.
&uger King. lOS S. Ct. at 2184-84 (citations omitted). This language seems to en\·ision
ciJrnmsrances in which jurisdiction would be appropriate Voithout a showing of purposeful
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jurisdiction jurisprudence. Part IV will demonstrate that courts
have facilitated the expansion and enforcement of state and federal
substantive policies in a number of areas by interpreting the concept
of purposeful availment to include a defendant's act of placing its
products in the stream of commerce. These areas include products
liability, intellectual property, environmental law, and tax.
A. The Need for &1ended Jurisdiction

The evolution of personal jurisdiction doctrine coincided with
an era of rapid changes in the substantive tort law governing products liability. Beginning in the early 1960s, the privity of contract
requirement, which had circumscribed the utility of warranty
theories of products liability, was eliminated by statute or judicial
fiat in many jurisdictions. 66 States then began adopting section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which made manufacturers and distributors of defective products strictly liable for
design, manufacturing, and marketing defects that caused injuries to
persons or property. 67 To date, at least thirty-eight states have
a\'ailment by the defendant. Compare Perschbacher, supra note 4, at 625-28 (/huger King
"significantly dilutes" the purposeful avaiIment requirement). But see R. CASAD. supra
note 3, at § 2.04[2][e][viii] ("The existence of ... purposeful action ... while rerewuy.
is not sufficient. ").
66. Early in this century. many state courts created a food pnxlucts exception to the
privity of contract requirement 'for breach of warranty actions. In 1960. Kew Jersey
abolished the privity requirement in pnxlucts liability actions in the leading case of Henningsen \'. Bloomfield Motors .. Inc .• 32 N.J. 358. 161 A.2d 69 (960). Within the next
few years. most other state high courts followed suit. See generally 1 Prod. Liab. Rep.
(CCH) § 1210 and cases cited therein. In addition, many state legislatures adopred U.C.c.
§ 2-318 of the Uniform Commexcial Code, which expressly abolishes the requirement of
horizontal privity in warranty actions and has been interpreted in many jurisdictions to
abolish the vertical privity requirement as well. See generally J. WIDTE & R. St.'WMERS,
U~1I'OR.\{ CoMMERCIAL CODE 401-10 (2d ed. 1980). Although strict products Iiability
theories have supplanted the need to rely on warranty theories in personal injury and pr0perty damage cases in most jurisdictions. the latter are still important in states that ha\'e
refused to adopt strict liability. They may also be important where innocent bystanders,
rather than direct consumers of products. are injured as a result of product defects. See
King & ~e\'ille. The Bystander's Right Under Stria liability Does Erist: A Call for
Reform of the Restatement. 25 ST. LollS l:.L.J. 543 (1981); Note. Strict Prrxbu:ts liability to the Bystander: A Study in Common Law Determinism. 38 l:. Cm. L. REv. 625
(1971).
67. Section 402A pro\ides:
(1) One v.ilo sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or conswner. or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product. and
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embraced the basic theory of strict liability articulated in section
402A; another eight have some variation of strict liability in defective products cases. 68
These developments made it far more likely that plaintiffs alleging injuries caused by defective products would have the interest and
incentive to sue defendants having few if any direct contacts with
the state in which injury occurred. Not surprisingly, the stream of
commerce theory originated and has been invoked most often iIi
products liability cases. 69 In products liability cases, the theory
enables courts to assert specific jurisdiction over all defendants who
may be liable. In such actions, state tort law generally contemplates
joint and several liability for defendants within the chain of distribution. The plaintiff usually has the option of suing the retailer,
distributor, or manufacturer, or all of them, even though she likely
had direct contact only with the retailer.
In such cases, jurisdictional problems arise because those defendants higher than the retailer in the chain of distribution often have
no udirect" connections with the forum state. The defective product manufactured or marketed by these remote defendants enters the
stream of commerce outside the forum state. Perhaps it was purchased there by a broker or other middleman and sold to entities
operating within the forum state. 70 Alternatively, as was the case in
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product. and
(b) the user or consumer has DOt bought the product from or entered into any
comracrual relation with the seller.
REsr."lEME.'-' (Sro:>~L» OF TORTS § 402A (1963). The seller of a product includes the
manufacturer, distributor. and retailer. [d.. comment f. Most jurisdictions that have
adopted section 402A have extended its protection to bystanders as well as direct purchasers of products. thus significantly broadening the class of persons entitled to sue for
personal injuries or property damage resulting from product defects. See King & !'eville.
supra DOte 66. at 569-73; W. KEEros. D. DoBBS. R. KEEros & D. OWES. PROSSER "-'1)
~os1HELAwOFTORTS § 100 CW. Keeton 5th ed. 1984}.
68. For a listing of jurisdictions that have adopted section 402A of the Restatement or
some variation of strict liability theory. see 1 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) § 4016.
69. See Gray v. American Radiator & StandaId Sanitary COIJl., 22 m. 2d 432. 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961): see also, e.g.• Walsh v. Sational Seating Co .. 411 F. Supp. 564 tn.
Mass. 1976): Bush v. BASF Wyandotte CoIJl., 64 ~.C. App. 41, 306 S.E.2d 562 (1983):
Ross v. Spiegel, Inc.• 53 Ohio App. 2d 297.373 N.E.2d 1288 (977): Phillips v. Anchor
Hocking Glass CoIJl .• 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (966).
70. E.g.• Oswalt v. Scriplo. Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1981); Pennington Grain &
Seed, Inc. v. Murrow Bros. Seed Co .. Inc .. 400 So. 2d 157 (Fla. DiSl. Ct. App. 1981):
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Asahi, the defective product may have been incorporated as a component part of a finIshed product that was distributed in the forum
state or even nationwide.71 Typically, the remote defendant claims
that the relevant long arm statute does not authorize jurisdiction
over him and that he lacks sufficient minimum contacts with the
forum state to support an assertion of jurisdiction over him. 72
The stream. of commerce theory has also been invoked in cases
alleging patent, copyright, and trademark infringement and violations of federal antitrust, tax, and environmental laws. 73 It is parRostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 1985); Hewitt v. Eichelman's Subaru.
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (distribution through "independent" (49%
o\lmed) subsidiary; sales made F.O.B. Japan); Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699
S.W.2d 199 (rex. 1985) (sales through foreign broker).
71. E.g., Humble v. Toyota Motor Co., 727 F.2d 7(1) (8th Cir. 1984) (Japanese
manufacturer of component automobile part; jurisdiction denied); Ford Motor Co. v.
Atwood Vacuum Mach. Co.• 392 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 1981) (domestic manufacturer of
automobile part: jurisdiction upheld), cerro denied, 452 U.S. 901 (1981).
72. See, e.g., Thornton V. Toyota Motor Sales, 397 F. Supp. 476. 479 (N.D. Ga.
1975) (defendant denied sufficient contacts under Georgia long arm statute and federal constitutional law); Simeone v. Federal Press Co., 40 Conn. 173. 485 A.2d 587 (1984)
(defendant subject to jurisdiction under Connecticut·s long arm statute and under minimum
contacts test of due process); Waters v. Deutz Corp., 479 A.2d 273 (Del. 1984) (defendant
challenged assertion of jurisdiction under Delaware long arm statute and due process).
73. See, e.g., Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1985) (asserting jurisdiction over German manufacturer in patent infringement claim based on manufacturer's aggregate national contacts); Land-O-Nod Co. v. Bassett Furniture Indus., 708
F.2d 1338 (8th Cir. 1983) (invoking forum jurisdiction over patent infringement claim
based on defendant's sale of other products in forum and advertisement of infringing products in national trade magazine); Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein \'. Kaiser Stuhl Wine
Distrib. Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Stobilisierungsfonds]
(jurisdiction over Australian defendants proper where defendants had arranged for introduction of patent infringing product in L' .S. stream of commerce \\ith expectation that
product would be sold nationally); Amba Mktg. Sys. \'. Jobar Infl. Inc.• 551 F.2d 784 (9th
Cir. 1977) (jurisdiction over patent and trademark infringement sought by virtue of defendant's distribution of competing merchandise in interstate commerce): Triple A Partnership
v. MPL Communications, Inc.• 629 F. Supp. 1520 (D. Kan. 1986) (revenue received from
nation\\oide sale and promotion of defendant's composition sufficient to confer jurisdiction
in copyright infringement): Tonka Corp. v. ThiS Entertainment, Inc.• 638 F. Supp. 386
(D. Minn. 1985) (jurisdiction in trademark infringement claim based on defendant's placement of its television program into stream of commerce with expectation that viewers in all
states would watch): Payne v. Kristofferson, 631 F. Supp. 39. 43 <N.D. Ga. 1985) (defendant's nation\\ide recording. performance. promotion, and sale of copyrighted material
introduced infringing song into stream of commerce): Violet v. Picillo. 613 F. Supp. 1563
(D.R.I. 1985) (defendant producers of hazardous wastes, having introduced products into
stream of commerce. subject to jurisdiction of state where products were illegally
dumped): Cluysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp .• 589 F. Supp. 1182 m.D.c. 1984)
(jurisdiction theory in antitrust suit against joint venture based on future introduction of
proposed product into stream of commerce); United States Y. Toyota Motor Corp .• 561 F.
Supp. 354 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (sale of foreign defendant's products on nation\\ide basis
through wholly-owned domestic subsidiary gave rise to jurisdiction for IRS tax audit): Hin

Inc., 492 A.2d 23
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ticularly imponant in cases where an alien defendant has committed
the alleged violation of federal law abroad. Such defendants often
have no direct contacts with the United States, much less with any
particular state, because they insulate themselves from direct dealings in this country through various intermediaries. 74 Accordingly,
they can be sued in this country only to the extent that their indirect
marketing contacts are deemed constitutionally sufficient under
International Shoe and its progeny. 75

B. Origins and Evolution of the Stream of Commerce Theory
After International Shoe, state legislatures began to devise long
arm statutes with expansively worded provisions designed to take
advantage of the broad implications of minimum contacts analysis.
Most statutes specified the contacts and nature of conduct that would
subject a defendant to the jurisdiction of the state's courts, and they
generally provided for specific jurisdiction only. 76 A few states
v. Nissan Motor Co:, 399 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (jurisdiction over antitrust claim
against price-fixing
upheld where foreign defendant caused its products to be
shipped and sold in U.S.):
74. See supra I10le 73. Slobilisierungsfonds involved a West German defendant with a
domestic importer. Uni1ed States v Toyota, similarly, involved a Japanese defendant v.ith
a wbolly-ov..ned subsidiary.
75. The federal COW1S have exclusive jurisdiction over patent and copyright infringement cases, see 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1986), and concurrent jurisdiction over trademark
infringement cases. id. There is no federal statute authorizing nationwide service of process against defendants in such cases, and so under FED. R. Cr.... P. 4fe), the federal coon
must use state law standards to assess the validity of its assertion of personal jurisdiction.
Rule 4(e) thus requires the federal coon to consider the constitutional sufficiency of a
defendant's contacts v.ith the state in which the federal coon is sitting rather than its aggregate COntactS v.itb the United States.
In federal tax and antitrust cases. federal <;taMes permit nationwide service of process.
See 26 t:.S.c. § 7402(b) (1982) (tax suits by U.S.); 15 C.S.C. § 22 (1982) (antitruSt). In
these cases. the propriety of personal jurisdiction turns on whether the defendant's contacts
v.ith the l"nited States as a whole are constitutionally sufficient to support jurisdiction.
Some commentatOrS have urged that. in cases of alien defendants involving a federal
question. an aggregate contacts theory should be used irrespective of whether a state or
federal long arm statute is being used as a basis to acquire juriscliction. See. e.g.• Lilly.
Jurisdiction (A·er Domestic and Alien Defendanls, 69 VA. L. 1m.. 85. In Asahi. the
Supreme Coon expressly declined to address the aggregate contacts theory. Asahi. 107 S.
Ct. at 1033.
76. See. e.g., FL... STAT. § 48.193 (987); ME. REv. STAT. A,"!,. tit. 14. § 704-A
n980,: KA.'i". STAT. A'"!'. § 60-308 (1983): N.C. GEs. ST.>.T. § 1-7504 (1983): OHIo 1m".
Coo£ A,"!,. § 2307.382 (Anderson 1981); S.D. CooIFlED LAws A,"!,. § 15-7-2 (984).
Many specific jurisdiction statutes tracked to a large extent the language of the Illinois long
arm statute, 1955 lli. Laws p. 2238. 2245-46 (current version at ILL. 1m'. STAT. ch. 110.
§ 2-209 (1983». or of U~lF{)R)f hlER.S7...n: A."1> hTER..'i"AllOS.>J. PRocEDL"RES Acr § 1.03

consPiracy

(1986).
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opted for extremely broad statutes permitting their courts to exercise
jurisdiction whenever doing so was consistent with due process. 7'1
Beginning in the early 1960s, the enumerated jurisdiction
statutes were interpreted nearly uniformly as conferring jurisdiction
in "single tort" cases where an isolated contact with the forum state
resulted in injury to the plaintiff. 78 Statutory language was seldom
viewed as an obstacle to such an assertion of jurisdiction, and the
constitutionality of such assertions seemed settled by McGee. 79
Accordingly, most state and federal courts upheld the constitutionality of single tort jurisdictional provisions based on McGee's
reasoning. 80 The broad general jurisdiction statutes were also interpreted to confer jurisdiction in single tort cases.
The stream of commerce theory evolved quite naturally from
these single tort cases. One of the earliest decisions endorsing
the theory was Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp. ,81 an influential and widely cited case interpreting illinois'
long arm statute. Gray was a stream of commerce case in the purest
sense: an lllinois plaintiff injured in an explosion caused by an allegedly defective water heater sued both the Pennsylvania manufacturer
of the water heater and Titan, the Ohio manufacturer of a valve
77. E.g.. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CoDE § 410.10 (West 1973); R.I. GEs. u.v.-s § 9-5-33
(1985). Some state supreme courts have interpreted their enumerated jurisdiction Stannes
to contemplate the assertion of personal jurisdiction whenever constitutionally permissible.
thus eliminating the need for separate statutory and constitutional inquiries into the propriety of a particular assertion of juiisdiction. E.g., Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp..
100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966) (construing AML. R. CI\·. P. 4(e)(2»); State ex reI.
Deere and Co. v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1979) (construing Mo. A'~. ST."", §
506.500 (l987}): U-Anchor Advenising, Inc. v. Bun, 553 S.W.2d 7(JJ (Tex. 19F) (construing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. A'~. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964».
78. For examples of cases interpreting specific jurisdiction stanttes to confer jurisdiction based on a single act, see Currie. The Growth of the Long Ann: Eight Years of
Exrended Jurisdiaion in l/lin.ois, 1963 U. Iu.. L.F. 533, passim; Nore, &rroactive
Erpansion of State Court Jurisdiction Over Persons, 63 Cou."M. L. REv. 1105. 1105
nn.6-9 (1963).
79. See supra notes 33-35 and accompaDjing text.
SO. Rebozo 'i. Washington Post Co., 515 F.2d 1208. 1214 n.17 15th Cir. 1975):
Sewman v. Fleming, 331 F. Supp. (S.D. Ga. 1971): Beck v. Spindler. 256 Minn. 543. 99
N.W.2d 670 (959); Le\1.in v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 42 Misc. 2d 599. 249 ~.Y.S.2d
49 (1964).
81. 22 lli. 2d 432. 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). Although Gray is widely perceived as the
first case to invoke the stream of commerce theory, the opinion did not acrually use the
phrase "stream of commerce." The first decision explicitly to link the phrase ..ith personal jurisdiction doctrine appears to have been Williams v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp. 539.
546 (D. Minn. 1964). An early Oklahoma case bad upheld jurisdiction in what was essentially a stream of commerce case under an ancient "doing business" statute. S. Howes
Co. Y. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954).
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incorporated into the heater. Titan's sole apparent contact with illinois was that its product had caused injury there. 82 The cause of
action unquestionably was related to this contact.
Gray addressed both the statutory and the constitutional questions implicit in asserting jurisdiction based on the stream of commerce theory. The llIinois long ann statute authorized jurisdiction
over any defendant that "commi[ts] a tortious act within the
state. "83 Although Titan had never been in llIinois and had never
committed any physical act there, the court held that it fell within
the statutory language. Analogizing to rules governing choice of
law and commencement of the mnning of the statute of limitations,
the court reasoned that because the "last act" giving rise to the
lawsuit-the explosion-had occurred in Illinois, and because that
injury could be attributed to Titan's tortious behavior, Tjtan had
committed a tortious act within the state as the statute required. 84
The court explained its conception of the constitutional issue in
the following terms:
The relevant decisions since Pennoyer v. Neff show a development of the concept of personal jurisdiction from one which
requires service of process within the State to one which is
satisfied either if the act or transaction occurs there or if a defendant has engaged in a sufficiently substantial course of activity in
the state, provided always that reasonable notice and opportunity
to be heard are afforded . . . the trend in defining due process of
law is away from the emphasis on territorial limitations and
toward emphasis on providing adequate notice and opportunity to
be heard: from the court with immediate power over the defendant, toward the court in which both parties can most conveniently settle their dispute. 85

Given this understanding of the constitutional test for personal jurisdiction, the court reasoned, assertion of jurisdiction over the Ohio
defendant was undoubtedly permissible:
[I]f a corporation elects to sell its products for ultimate use in
another State, it is not unjust to hold it answerable there for any
damages caused by defects in those products . . . . Where the
alleged liability arises . . . from the manufacture of products
82. The roUIt assumed that, apart from the heater that injured the plaintiff, a substantial number of wetter heaters containing Titan's \"a1ves were sold in lllinois. But it is
unclear from the opinion whether the record supports this assnmption and whether this fact
was essential to the outcome of the case.
83. Iu.. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-209(2) (1983).
84. Gray. 22 TIL 2d at 435~36. 176 N.E.2d at 763.
85. Id. at 440-41, 176 N.E.2d at 765.
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presumably sold in contemplation of use here, it should not matter that the purchase was made from an independent middleman
or that someone other than the defendant shipped the product into
[the state]. "86

In Gray, the court was plainly mistaken in suggesting that ter-

ritorial concerns were no longer a significant aspect of the constitutional test for personal jurisdiction. Hanson had made that clear
three years earlier. Moreover, the Supreme Court had never intimated that the litmus test of due process was whether the forum
selected was "the court in which both parties can most conveniently
settle their dispute."81 Nevertheless, the court did address the
critical question of whether the defendant had purposefully availed
itself of the benefits of lllinois law. The court observed that the
defendant had engaged in a course of conduct that predictably had
resulted in the use of its products in Dlinois, a use from which it
received economic benefits. 88
Most courts and commentators have perceived Gray as consistent with the constitutional framework established in International
Shoe, McGee, and Hanson. 89 After all, cases upholding jurisdiction
on a stream of commerce theory are but one step removed from
cases in which an out-of-state manufacturer ships its product directly
to an in-state distributor or retailer.90 In the latter type of case, the
86. [d. at 442. 176 S.E.2d at 766.
87. Id. at 443. 176 S.E.2d at 766.
88. [d. For an important contemporaneous discussion of the Gray decision, see Currie, supra note 78. at 545-60. See also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at
1151-52.
.
89. E.g.• Baker \". Associated Banking Corp .. 592 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1979): ~icBreen
v. Beech .-\ircraft Corp .. 543 F.2d 26,30 17th Cir. 1976) (dictum): Jones Enter. , .. Atlas
Ser\". Corp .. 442 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1971); Blum v. Kawaguchi. 331 F. Supp. 216
(D. Seb. 1971): Phillips .... Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732
(966); Currie. supra DOte 78, at 560 ('·the upholding of jurisdiction in Gray • .• was a
commendable decision . . . fully consistent v.ith the due-process requiremem of fimdamental fairness'").
90. E.g.• Chovan .... E. I. DuPont de Semours & Co .. 217 F. Supp. 808 fE.D. Mich.
1963,: Hutchinson v. Boyd & Sons Press Sales, 188 F. Supp. 876 (D. Minn. 1960). As
one court observed:
[\\lhere a corporation v.ith substantial contacts within state X ships into that state
a product which it has manufactured in State Y and an injury occurs in state X
because of an alleged defect in the product. the corporation may cOnstitutionally
be called upon to defend a products liability suit brought in state X where the
injury occurred. This result also oOOrins v.-here the manufacturer has elected to
distribute his wares through independem wholesaler!; instead of through its OV.ll
corporate appararus so that it is only very indirectly responsible for the product
reaching the injured consumer. The present trend is to take the next logical step
and hold that corporation ansv.-erable where it introduces its product into the
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manufacturer has purposefully established a contact with the state in
question. It has derived economic benefits from the contact. Hanson's purposeful availment requirement is clearly met.
When a product comes into a state via the efforts of an out-ofstate distributor, a broker, or the manufacn.rrer of a finished product
into which the product has been incorporated, the manufacturer's
contacts may not be as direct, but they are nevertheless the result of
its purposeful activity. If it wishes to avoid accountability for itS
product's defects in a particular state, a manufacturer has the option
of distributing its product through intermediaries who will not sell it
there. It seems questionable to suggest that a state cannot assert
specific jurisdiction when the manufacn.rrer fully expects its goods to
be sold within the state, and the goods subsequently cause injury
there.
Initially, many courts embracing the stream of commerce theory after Gray reasoned that whenever it was "foreseeable" to the
defendant that its product would find its way into the state, the
notice function of the due process requirement was satisfied. 91 This
""foreseeability" test permitted state courts to entertain suits not just
against defendants who place goods in the stream of commerce with
the expectation that they would be marketed in a particular state, but
also against defendants who market consumer goods anywhere,
because manufacturers can always foresee that such goods may be
taken by their purchasers to remote jurisdictions.
Of course, this broad foreseeability conception of the theory is
inconsistent with World-Wide Volkswagen, in which the Court stated
that the portability or mobility of a consumer good does not, by
itself, furnish adequate notice of the possibility of being sued in a
stream of iDletstate COIDJIlelCe if it had reason to know or expect that its product
would be broaght into the stale where the injury occurred [ .]

Coolter v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 426 F.2d 1315. 1318 (5th Cir. 1970) (citations
omitted).
91. Su. e.g., Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591, 597 (5th Cir. 1969)
(jurisdiction proper where defendant ..introduced [carnival ride] into interstate commerce
with reason to know that the ride would probably eventually oomadize through the state");
Adanbc Tubing & Rubber Co. v. Imematiooal Engraving Co., 364 F. Supp. 787. 791-92
(D.R.L 1973) (coosuuing Gray to pemrlt assenion of jurisdiction whenever it is
foresceabloe that defendant's product may cause injury in the stale) (dictum); Anderson v.
Nabooal Presto Indus.• 257 Iowa 911. 135 NoW. 639. 643 (1965) (jurisdiction proper over
U0l • .r:g1Dret' whose products are "ordinarily designed for commercial sale in whatever
maIhIs may be fowJd for them"); Blamey ,'. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978)
(jnrisdidion proper where defendant could foresee that sale of liquor at Wisconsin border
bar coo1d have consequences in Minnesota).
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remote jurisdiction.92 But World-Wule Volkswagen cannot be
perceived as a repudiation of a stream of commerce theory based on
the notion of expectation rather than foreseeability. Indeed, the
majority distinguished cases such as Gray, in which a corporation
has "deIiver[ed] its products into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
State, "93 and stated explicitly in dicta that the assertion of jurisdiction in such a case would not violate due process. 94
The Supreme Court's express sanction of the stream of commerce theory in World-Wide Volkswagen, which was reiterated in
Burger King, 9S appeared to resolve any lingering doubts about its
validity. Most courts subsequently accepted the theory, many basing their decisions on the Court's earlier dicta. 96 Indeed, after
World-Wide Volkswagen, a number of states amended their long arm
statutes to provide explicitly for personal jurisdiction over defendants whose products enter the state through the regular course of
commerce. 97 By the time the Court rendered its Asahi decision
early in 1987, courts in at least sixteen states,98 and most federal
92. World-Wule Volkswagen, 444 u.s at 295-96.
93. Id. at 298.
94. Id. at 297-98.
95. 471 u.S. at 474 n.l7.
96. Indeed, the California Supreme Court expressly relied on World-Yule
Yolhwagm's dicta cooceming the stream of connnerce theory in upboIding the Asahi trial
court's assertion of jurisdiction. Asahi, 39 Cal. 3d at 45, 7(12 P.2d at 548,216 Cal. Rptr.
at 389. See also, e.g., Noel v. S: S. Kresge Co., 669 F.2d 1150, 1153-55 (6th Cir. 1982);
Oswalt v. Scripta, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980); Tonka Corp. v. TMS Entertainment, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 386,389 (D. Minn. 1985); Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc.
v. Toshiba Corp .• 576 F. Supp. 312, 317 (D. Md. 1983); McBead Drilling Co. v.
Kremco, Ltd., 509 So. 2d 429,432 (La. 1987); Hewitt v. Eicbelman's Subaru, Inc., 492
A.2d 23, 25-26 (Pa. Super. 1985) (all upbolding stream of connnerce theoty based on
World-Wule Yolhwagm).
97. Al.As1tA STAT. § 09.05.015(4)(B) (1983) (instate injury from products processed or
manufactured by defendant if used or coosumed in ontinaIy course of trade); FlA. STAT.
A-.s. § 48.193(1)(f)(2) (Supp. 1987) (causing injury within Florida if products mamlfactmed by defendant were used in ordinaIy course of COIDJIJClCC, trade, or use); LA. REv.
STAT. A,,"S. § 13:3201(8) (West Supp. 1987) (mamfidwing of product inboduced inIo
stream of commerce if foreseeable that product's nature and manufacturer's marketing
practices woold bring product inro Louisiana); NEV. REV. STAT. § 14.080 (1985) (service
proper over any manufacturer who directly or indirectly mannfactures, markets or soppIics
any product for instate distribution); N.C. GEs. STAT. § 1-75.4(4){b) (1983) (mstate injury
from products processed, serviced, or manufactured by defendant if used in ordinary
course of trade); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. A,"S. § 5322(a)(l)(iii) (Purdon 1981) ("doing
business" in Pennsylvania includes shipping of merchandise directly or indiIectly inIo
state).
98. AJJjance Clodling, Ltd. v. District Court, 187 Colo. 400, 532 P.2d 351 (1975);
Waters v. Deutz Corp., 479 A.2d 273 (Del. 1984); N"KXlId, Inc. v. Beutoo, 467 So. 2d
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appellate courts99 had mled that the stream of commerce theory
comported with the principles articulated in International Shoe and
its progeny. 100
V. Justifying and Defending the Stream of Commerce Theory:
The Asahi Opinions

m

As Part
above demonstrated, the Court's decisions have been
somewhat inconsistent in their pronouncements of the meaning and
role of purposeful availment inquiry, with Shaffer, Kulko, and
Burger King emphasizing fairness and Hanson and World-WuIe
Volkswagen fOcusing on sovereignty concerns. But Asahi raised the
question in the context of the stream of commerce theory, a context
that had never been considered directly by the Court. The three
Asahi opinions are suggestive of a fundamental disagreement among
the justices concerning the meaning of purposeful availment and its
relevance to jurisdictional analysis. More troublesome is that the
dissension on the Court may undermine the Validity of the stream of
commerce theory as it bas been understood and utiHzed by the lower
courts.
This part of the article considers the rationale given by the
O'Connor plurality and some lower courts for rejecting the stream
of commerce theory in specific jurisdiction cases. It contends that
this reasoning cannot be reconciled with the Court' s prior jurisdictional decisions. It further contends that the approach taken by a
few lower courts, and perhaps by Justice Stevens-under which the
1046 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1985); Doolin v. K·5 Telegage Co.• 75 TIL App. 3d 25, 393
N.E.2d 556 (1979); Svendson v. Qaestor Corp.• 304 N.W.2d 428 (Iowa 1981); Volvo
Corp. v. Wells. 551 S.W.2d 826 (Ky. App. 1977): Boykin ". Lindenkranar, 252 So, 2d
467 (La. Ct. App. 1971); Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 95 (Minn. App. 1984);
Metal-Malic. Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Coon,. 82 Nev. 263, 415 P.2d 617 (1966);
Darien v. Wise Shoe Stores. 74 A.D.2d 342,427 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1980); Bush , .. BASF
Wyandroe Corp •• 64 N.C. App. 41. 306 S.E.2d 562 (1983); Ross v. Spiegel. Inc., 53
Ohio App. 2d 297, 373 N.E.2d 1288 (1977); Russell v. Bakom Chems., Inc., 328
N.W.2d 476 (S.D. 1983); McCombs v. Cen:o Rentals. 622 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. App.
1981); Demscb v. West Coast Mach. Co., 80 Wash. 2d 701,497 P.2d 1311. cert. denied.
409 U.S. 1009 (1972); Olmstead v. American Granby Co., S65 P.2d 108 (Wyo. 1977).
99. E.g.• Manralbano v. Basco Hand Tools, 766 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1985); Fidelity and
Casnalty Co. ,'. Philadelphia Resins Corp., 766 F.2d 440 (lOth Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 853 (1986); Nelson v. Park Indus., Inc., 717 E2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
dm:ied 104 S. Ct. 1278 (1984); Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir.
1983); Stabilisioungsfonds, 647 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1981): Poyner ". Erma Werke
GmbH. 618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1980). cert. denied, 449 u.s. 841 (1980)
100. Sa also R. CAS..u>, supra note 3, at § 7.02[d].
HeinOnline -- 7 Rev. Litig. 268 1987-1988

1988]

PERSONAL JURlSDICI10N

269

appropriateness of jurisdiction turns primarily on quantitative factors-is also flawed. This part concludes by suggesting that regardless of how one conceives the purposes of the due process limitation
on state court personal jurisdiction, those purposes are not impaired
when a court relies on the stream of commerce theory to support its
assertion of specific jurisdiction.
A. The O'Connor Plurality: Fault)' Premises and Troubling
Implications

Courts that have rejected the stream of commerce theory
usually base their decisions on two premises. The first is that
placing an article in the stream of commerce, with knowledge that
it will be marketed and used in a remote jurisdiction, does not
amount to purposeful availment as that term was used in Hanson
and World-Wuie Volkswagen. The second is that a state court
never assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant unless that defendant has purposefully availed itself of the benefits of the forum
state's laws. To the extent that these premises purport to be derived
from the Supreme Court's most recent jurisdictional decisions, both
are faulty.
The O'Connor plurality opinion illustrates the faultiness of
these premises. It insists that Asahi had not engaged in acts constituting "purposeful availment," a position with which the Brennan
plurality expressly disagreed. 101 Justice O'Connor accepted, for the
purposes of decision, that Asahi knew that a significant number of
its valves were incorporated into tires marketed in California. She
reasoned, however, that because Asahi did not ""create, control, or
employ"I02 Cheng Shin's distribution network, did not specifically
design its valves for use in California, and therefore did not have the
kind and quantum of contacts that enable courts to conclude that a
corporation is ""doing business" within a state, it had never purposefully availed itself of the California market. In essence, the
O'Connor plurality treated the facts underlying the cause of action
in Asahi as conceptually indistinguishable from the facts underlying
Hanson and World-Wuie Volkswagen.
Yet surely there is a critical difference between the retailer
defendant in World-Wide Volkswagen, whose contacts with

may

101. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1035.
102. Id. at 1033.
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Oklahoma resulted exclusively from the plaintiff's activities (Le.
travelling through Oklahoma and having an accident there) and a
defendant such as Asahi, whose contacts were the result of its own
decision to sell its component parts to a manufacturer engaged in a
worldwide marketing scheme. Courts, including the Supreme Court
in WorId-W"ule Volkswagen,l03 and commentators have consistently
recognized a distinction between ""portable tort" cases, in which a
plaintiff-consumer or other third party is exclusively responsible for
taking the injury-causing agent into the forum state, and true stream
of commerce cases, in which a product causes injury in a jurisdiction where it was original1y sold. 1M In the former category of
cases, a defendant derives no measurable economic benefit from the
plaintiff's ability to carry the product across state lines, and thus
cannot be said to have availed itself of that particular mark~. In the
latter category, the defendant who adopts a marketing scheme that
expressly contemplates sales in a remote jurisdiction certainly profits as a result of its intermediary's sales within that jurisdiction.
Thus, even if purposeful availment is an essential aspect of fairness,
one who deliberately places his product into the stream of commerce
under circumstances clearly indicating that the product will be sold
in state X has met this threshold requirement as to state X.
Presumptively, he oUght to be subject to a lawsuit related to the
product there unless other fairness considerations dictate otherwise.
Why, then, have four justices in Asahi and several lower courts
insisted that the stream of commerce theory does not adequately
encompass purposeful availment? One explanation may be that they
failed to perceive a difference between ""foreseeability" and ""expectation." The O'Connor plurality thought that it was merely
foreseeable to Asabi that its valves would make their way to California, and foreseeability alone, according to World-W"ule Volkswagen, lOS does not furnish constitutionally sufficient notice of a
court's potential claim to jurisdiction. This is absurd. Because
Cheng Shin had sold tires containing Asahi's valves to a California
motorcycle mamlfacturer for a number of years, the possibility that
one of those valves, if defective, might cause injury in California
103. World-Yule Volkswagen, 444 u.s. at 295-97.
104. E.g., DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1981)
(stream of commerce theory inapplicable where Japanese company performed conversion
work in Japan on COOWJelciaI vessel, and vessel subsequently docked in New Jersey): see
also Corrie, supm DOte 78, at 551; Jay, supm note 3, at 442-43, 448-50.
lOS. World-Yule Volkslrogen, 444 U.S. at 295.
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was not merely foreseeable. It was virtually cenain. Wherever one
draws the line between foreseeability and expectation, the facts of
almost any pure stream of commerce case, including those of Asahi,
seem to fall on the side of expectation.
Another explanation may be that the O'Connor plurality equates
"unilateral" acts by third parties with "indirect" acts requiring the
assistance of third parties. Hanson and World-Wide Volkswagen
said that the conduct of third parties alone cannot create contacts
sufficient to support jurisdiction. 106 But these cases did not say that
contacts created with the help of third parties are irrelevant to the
jurisdictional question. In both cases, the defendant's contacts with
the forum state materialized after the relationship giving rise to the
lawsuit was formed and resulted from a third party's decision to
cross state lines. In Asahi, however, the defendant's contacts with
the forum state were created when its products made their way into
the forum state, which was before its relationship began with the
original plaintiff-when the plaintiff purchased the motorcycle with
a defective tire valve. 107 The plaintiff's purchase was the expected
result of Asahi's marketing strategy of selling to a Taiwanese tire
manufacturer that did business within California. Although Cheng
Shin had assisted Asahi in establishing its pre-accident relationship
with the state, Asahi's contacts with California were not exclusively
the result of "unilateral" activity by a third party. Indeed, a variation of this argument had been rejected in Calder, in which the
Court had held that the defendants' nonparticipation in the distribution of offending magazines did not warrant characterizing their
activities as nonpurposeful. 108
The notion that indirect contacts with a state are not purposeful
has serious implications. For example, it suggests that a remote
manufacturer can always insulate itself from lawsuits in any state (or
country) other than its own by selling its products F.O.B. at a single
location, by using a single "independent" distributor to distribute
its product nationwide, or by using brokers who theoretically are
"responsible" for any direct contacts with a particular forum. Such
a scenario could have a serious adverse impact on the development
of state products liability law, impair enforcement of many federal
106. [d. at 298: Hanson, 357 C.S. at 253.
107. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1030.
108. Calder, 465 C.S. at 789-90.
HeinOnline -- 7 Rev. Litig. 271 1987-1988

272

mE REVIEW OF LITIGATION

[Vol. 7:239

laws, and result in heavy litigation burdens on all parties involved in
these lawsuits.
One could argue that the O'Connor plurality's view that Asahi
had not purposefully directed its activities toward California was
influenced by the fact that only an indemnity action was at stake. 109
Cheng Shin, after all, was the entity that was directly responsible
for distributing Asahi's product in California. In this sense, Cheng
Shin is arguably much like the plaintiff in World-Wide Volkn4,'agen:
and the case is similar to the portable tort cases that are not generally perceived as falling within the stream of commerce theory.
Yet the O'Connor plurality did not limit its rejection of the
stream of commerce theory to indemnity cases not involving a plaintiff actually injured by a defective product. What the opinion said
about the purposeful availment requirement would have prevented
the original plaintiff from suing Asahi in California as well. Moreover, there is little support in the Court's past decisions for drawing
this kind of distinction.110 If the O'Connor plurality had confined
its reasoning to indemnity cases, it would have been suggesting that
whether or not a defendant's connections with a state are the result
of purposeful availment depends on who the plaintiff is. This misdirects the inquiry from the nature of the defendant's activities to the
nature of the cause of action and confuses the narrow question of
what constitutes purposeful availment with the broader one of
whether the assertion of jurisdiction is reasonable.
A less obvious, but in some respects more troubling, consequence of viewing the stream of commerce theory as constitutionally
inadequate is that this would conform to the narrow and now questionable Hanson view that the virtually dispositive test for jurisdictional propriety is whether there has been purposeful availment. As
noted earlier, the Court's most recent pre-Asahi decisions shifted the
theoretical focus away from sovereignty concerns toward a pure
assessment of whether the exercise of jurisdiction is "fair." 111 One
consequence of this, which Burger King tends to support, is that the
concept of purposeful availment assumes its original role as a fairness factor. Other factors include whether: (1) the court is asserting
109. At least one coon has limited Asah!'s prounouncemell1S on the stream of commerce
theoty to indemnity cases. See McBead Drilling Co. \'. Kremco, Ltd., 509 So. 2d 429,
433 n.7 (La. 1987).
110. See supra text accompanying note 15.
Ill. See supra text accompanying note 65.
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specific or general jurisdiction, (2) the chosen forum is a convenient
one, and (3) the state has an interest in regulating the matter at
issue.
That the O'Connor plurality placed so much emphasis on purposefill availment may suggest a division on the Court about the role
of federalism in personal jurisdiction doctrine. The only recent
cases that treated the question of purposeful availment as dispositive
were those in which territorial concerns were deemed predominant:
Hanson and World-Wide Volkswagen. The disagreement among the
justices about whether the stream of commerce theory is constitutionally adequate may mask a more basic split about the conceptual
underpinnings of personal jurisdiction doctrine. If some members
of the Coun disagree with the current trend toward repudiating the
idea that personal jurisdiction doctrine protects state sovereignty,
they should express their disagreement explicitly.
Moreover, even if one does believe that the due process limitations on personal jurisdiction should protect state sovereignty, the
stream of commerce theory is consistent with such an approach. In
international law, one well-recognized aspect of territorial jurisdiction is "effects" jurisdiction: a state has jurisdiction over acts having tangible consequen~es or effects within the state. 112 Effects
jurisdiction justifies, for example, a state's criminalizing conduct
that actually takes place outside the state but that causes injury
within the state. 113 In most circumstances, the exercise of effects
112. Effects jurisdiction is based on the objective territorial principle of international
law. See generally !\ore. Extraterritorial Application of the Export Administration Acr of
1979 (;nder ImemaJional and American Law, 81 MIcH. L. R:;\'. 1308, 1327-1329 (1983).
Although the scope of effects jurisdiction is unclear and the "C.S. couns' extension of the
principle to cover intangible economic effects criticized, it appears that most authorities
and states would recognize effects jurisdiction where effects are direct, immediate, and
form a pan of the actus reus that is sought to be regulated. h[MJany countries ... interpret crimina1law in the sense that offenses. the authors of which at the momem of commission of [the crime] are in the territory of another state. are nevertheless to be regarded as
having been committed in the national territory. if one of the constituent elements of the
offense, and more especially its effects, have taken place there . . . . " Case of the 5.5.
Lotus (France and Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.1., Ser. A., No. 10, 19-23 (Judgment of Sept. 7).
2 World Ct. Rep. (1930). See also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.ld
597, 611-12 (9th Cir. 1976); Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiaion and the C:niud Slates
Antitrust J.m.,·s, 1957 BRIT. Y.B. hTL L. 146, 160; Rosenthal, Jllrisdictiona1 Conflicts
Between Sol'ereign Nalions, 19 hT:' kw. 487, 494 (1985). The Supreme Coun
expressly acknowledged the validity of effects jurisdiction in Calder \'. Jones. 46S "C.S.
783, 789 (1984).

113. See generally REsr....l"EME.'"T

(SECO~1»

OF

FORElGS REu.t1O~S LA",'

Su. m § 18 (1965).
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jurisdiction is fully compatible with territorial limitations because
one aspect of the entire criminal transaction occurs within the state' s
borders.
A state's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant
whose product causes injury within the state would seem consistent
with effects jurisdiction for the same reason. The defendant's conduct outside the jurisdiction has caused injury within it: hence, a
court is justified in asserting personal jurisdiction. Surely a state
has an interest in protecting its residents from injuries directly
caused by out-of-state actors. A state does not infringe on the
sovereignty of another state or .otherwise impair federalism by exercising its judicial power to protect an injured resident. 114
Courts that have rejected the stream of commerce theory
outright,115 including the O'Connor plurality, seem disingenuous for
their failure to distinguish the facts of the cases before them from
cases such as Gray, the result of which had been approved expressly
in World-Wule Volkswagen. Alternatively, the Court could explicitly repudiate its dicta in that case, and in more recent ones such as
Burger King, that have affirmed the theory's validity and seemingly
rejected a territorial approach to personal jurisdiction.
More troublesome are the implications of the O'Connor plurality's view, should it ultimately prevail in the Supreme Court, for
future products liability litigati.on1l6 and for litigation involving
important areas of federal law and policy. In the products liability
area, for example, the substantive tort law of most jurisdictions contemplates that all entities within the distribution chain should be
liable to a consumer who is injured by a defective product. One
purpose of this extensive liability scheme is to bring to bear on those
who manufacture and market consumer products the greatest possible pressure to make those products safe. Construing the purposeful
availment requirement narrowly to exclude marketing conduct erects
an important procedural hurdle to effective and efficient enforce114. But see Currie, supra note 78, at 549 (stating that "[ilt would be odd if in a federal
system fa state] could DO( enter a judgment against a man who stands in Indiana firing a
gun at people in Dlioois; the man ...-00 ships in food is in no different position").

115. See supra note 8.
116. "The most ominous aspecr of the [O'Connor plurality's] opinion is that four
Justices joined in the finding that Asahi did not have minimum contacts with California.
Although none of the opinions say so directly, this means that jurisdiction over Asahi was
DOt available in the California courts even on behalf of slain and mangled California
residents." Weintraub. Asahi Sends Personal Jurisdiction Do~71 the Tubes. 23 TEX. l'Tl
LJ. 55, 66 (footnotes omitted).
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ment of substantive tort policies by denying many litigants the
opportunity to prosecute products liability claims in a single forum.
The notion that indirect contacts with a state, such as Asahi' s
contacts with California, are insufficient to support specific jurisdi~on invites multistate marketing schemes dependent upon
brokers, "independent" distributors. and similar middlemen whose
presence along the chain of distribution will effectively insulate
those truly responsible for product defects from liability to those
whom their products have injured. 117 Given the potentially serious
impact of this view on the future development of state products
liability law, and the certainty that this question will have to be
resolved by the Supreme Court, it is unfortunate that the five other
members of the Asalzi Court were unable to articulate a coherent
explanation of why existing jurisdictional doctrine readily accommodates the stream of commerce theory.

B. Justice Stevens: A Problematic View
At least two federal appellate courts have taken the position that
the stream of commerce theory does not justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction, at least when a very small number of the defendant's products have been sold in a remote state. lIS Justice Stevens'
concurring opinion appears to espouse a similar view in suggesting
that the validity of the stream of commerce theory depends on a
number of quantitative· factors which may vary from case to
case. 119 This approach ascribes a fundamentally different meaning
to purposeful availmenrthan is expressed in the Brennan plurality'S
opinion. 120
According to the Stevens view, whether or not a defendant's act
of placing a product in the stream of commerce can be characterized
as "purposeful direction" of his activities toward a particular state,
seems to turn on the quantum of sales made within the jurisdiction
in question relative to the defendant's total sales, the value of those
sales, and the hazardous nature of the products involved, rather than
117. See Uf. at 69-70.

See Chung v. ~k~A Dev. Corp .. 783 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1986): Dalmau v. Hughes
Aircraft Co.• 781 E2d 9 {Ist Cir. 1986}; see also Max Daet\\-yler Corp. 10·. R. Meyer. 762
F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1985) (three sales 1.1.ithin jurisdiction insufficient to support jurisdiction).
118. Asahi. 107 S. Ct. at 1038 (Ste1o·ens. 1.. concurring in part and in judgment).
119. See supra text accompanying note 16.
120. Id.
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the nature of the defendant's acts. 12l While this view has some
appeal, it raises new problems.
It may be that Justice Stevens' position is that the line between
"foreseeability" and "expectation" must be drawn with reference
to the number of the defendant's products that make their way into
the state through marketing channels. Yet Justice Stevens' notion
that "volume, value, and the hazardous character"122 of the defendant's indirect sales within the forum state are all relevant to the
purposeful availment question suggests something different-that
quantitative factors bear on whether a defendant's acts constitute
purposeful availment. That is, he would seemingly focus on the
extent of the defendant's contacts Vrith the forum, rather than on the
manner in which those contacts were created, to determine whether
the defendant's acts constitute purposeful availment. This implies
that Asahi would not have been amenable to suit in California if
only one of its valves had been sold there and that particular valve
caused an injury-even if Asahi actually knew this would occur. It
also suggests that the retailer defendant in World-W'ule Volkswagen
might have been held to have purposefully availed itself of the
benefits of the Oklahoma market if the plaintiffs had shown that
hundreds of automobiles sold by the retailer were regularly driven
through Oklahoma.
The difficulty with this analysis is that it confuses the narrow
question of whether a defendant's acts constitute purposeful availment with the broader and fundamentally different question of
whether a defendant's contacts are sufficient to support general
jurisdiction. One can imagine a situation in which the flow of a
defendant's products into a state via the stream of commerce is so
steady and of such quantity that the defendant can be said to be
doing business there, and, therefore, is amenable to jurisdiction in
both related and unrelated lawsuits. . Quantitative factors such as
those noted by Justice Stevens are undoubtedly relevant to this type
of inquiry .123 It is difficult to understand, however, how such quantitative factors are relevant to whether the defendant's acts constitute
purposeful availment except insofar as they serve as evidence that
the defendant knew or should have known that his product would be
12L [d..

122. See generally Helicopteros. 466 t:.s. 408 (1984): Beany v. Beech Aircraft Corp ..
818 F.2d 370 (5th eir. 1981•.
123. :uahi. 107 S. Ct. at 1038 (Stevens. J .. concurring in pan and 1D judgment'.
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used in a particular jurisdiction and might give rise to productrelated litigation there.
A quantitative approach is problematic for another reason: it
offers no guidance as to what level of interaction with the forum
state counts as purposeful availment. In Asahi, Justice Stevens indicated that he would be "inclined" to hold that "a regular course of
dealing that results in deliveries of over 100,000 units annually over
a period of several years would constitute 'purposeful availment.' "124 This implies that at some reduced level the defendant's
conduct cannot be considered purposeful. How much less, however, is not clear. Would indirect sales in the state of 100,000 units
during a single year constitute purposeful availment? Would direct
sales of 150 units in four consecutive years suffice? Would sales
amounting to .0005 percent of defendant's total annual revenues? A
quantitative treatment of the purposeful availment issue raises practical problems that make it impossible to decide specific cases on
any principled basis. If the objective of personal jurisdiction rules
is to provide •'notice" to a defendant when his activities will subject
him to a court's jurisdiction, then this ""quantitative" approach fails
in its essential purpose.

C. The Brennan Plurality: Hope for the Stream of Commerce
Theory

Of the three opinions rendered in Asahi, only Justice Brennan' s
plurality opinion expresses unequivocal approval of the stream of
commerce theory of personal jurisdiction. According to Justice
Brennan. the theory is consistent with the Court's prior decisions on
purposeful availment and with the underlying purposes of procedural due process. 12S In his view, a defendant whose product is
marketed in a remote jurisdiction receives benefits from that jurisdiction irrespective of whether his marketing activity is direct or
indirect. Moreover, when such a defendant is or should be aware
that his product is being sold in a particular state, he likewise ought
to know that a suit may be filed against him there if his product
should cause injury. Thus, whether the purposeful availment
124. Id. at 1035-3i lBrennan. J•• concurring in pan and in judgment).
125. Indeed. inasmuch as the due process clause prorectS .. ·persons·. not 'defendants: .. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shuns, 472 lJ.S. 797. 811 (985). one can argue that
M1 permining a state coon to assert jurisdiction over stream of commerce defendants
might in some circumstances violate the due process rights of the innocent victims.
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requirement serves to protect state sovereignty, to ensure notice
(and hence, fairness), or both, the requirement is satisfied in a
typical stream of commerce case.
Justice Brennan is surely correct. The stream of commerce theory rests on the premise that it is not unfair to assert specific jurisdiction over a defendant who knows or should know that his product
is being marketed in a remote jurisdiction. Such a defendant is on
notice that his product may cause injury in that jurisdiction, and
should be on notice that he may be "haled into court" there to
defend a civil action arising from the use of his product. In virtually all cases, the defendant has deliberately chosen a marketing
scheme that contemplates distribution of his product within the
remote jurisdiction. It has the power to prevent distribution there
directly (by extracting appropriate contractual agreements .with his
distributors) or indirectly (by dealing only with manufacturers or
distributors who do not do business within jurisdictions where it
does not wish to be sued). The defendant has enjoyed economic
benefits flowing from the sales of his product within the state. In
short, no matter how one conceives the purposes of procedural due
process in the personal jurisdiction context, they are not offended
when a state court uses the stream of commerce theory as a justification for asserting person3I jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

VI. Conclusion
The stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction has
coexisted peacefully with the notion of "purposeful availment"
since at least 1961, when Gray was decided. It has been used to
justify jurisdiction, almost exclusively, in specific jurisdiction cases
by plaintiffs who have suffered serious bodily injury, property
damage, or economic injury. The theory allows states to realize the
objectives of their products liability laws and allocate liability
among joint tortfeasors in a single proceeding held in a single
forum.
In light of the importance of the stream of commerce theory,
the Supreme Court's failure to resolve the issue of its validity in
Asahi is troubling. Those concerned about the future of products
liability litigation can only hope that the Court will soon take steps
to resolve the unfortunate ambiguities and uncertainties that are
Asahi's legacy.
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